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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Courts of Appeals split about whether state
felony drug convictions, which were punishable only as misdemeanors
under federal law, constituted aggravated felonies under immigration
law.1 The controversy was based upon the interpretation of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). Under the Act, an alien
who is convicted of an “aggravated felony” is automatically deported
from the United States.2 According to the INA, an aggravated felony
includes “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance . . . including a
drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18).”3
Although the INA does not define “illicit trafficking,” Title 18 of the
United States Code defines “the term ‘drug trafficking crime’ [as] any
felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. [§]
4
801 et seq.).” Although the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) is a

* 2007 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. United States v. Briones-Mata, 116 F.3d 308, 310 (8th Cir. 1997), quoted in United
States v. Hernandez-Avalos, 251 F.3d 505, 510 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that Congress made a
deliberate choice to include, as “aggravated felonies,” state felony convictions that would
qualify only as misdemeanors under federal law); Aguirre v. Immigration and Naturalization
Serv., 79 F.3d 315, 317 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding, in contrast to the Fifth and Eighth Circuit, that
nationwide uniformity is important and state felonies are not aggravated felonies if the
conviction would only amount to a misdemeanor under federal law).
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(43)(B).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2).
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federal statute, the INA’s definitions of aggravated felonies expressly
5
include crimes “whether in violation of state and federal law.”
Because the INA was intended to include state convictions, the Court
needed to clarify whether an “aggravated felony” under the INA
included a felony conviction by state court that under federal law
would be classified as only a misdemeanor.
In Lopez v. Gonzales and Toledo-Flores v. United States the
6
Supreme Court answered this question. Two non-citizens faced
deportation for conviction for drug related offenses. Lopez was
convicted of aiding and abetting the possession of cocaine, a felony
under South Dakota law. In 1998, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) initiated removal proceedings against Lopez, and he
subsequently filed for a cancellation of the removal under INA §
240(a). However, Lopez was forbidden from cancelling the removal
because of his status as an aggravated felon.7 Lopez appealed the
denial of his application, arguing that his South Dakota conviction
was not an aggravated felony because it was not a felony under the
CSA.
Toledo-Flores was convicted of felonious possession of cocaine in
Texas. He was sentenced to two years in prison following his guilty
plea for improper entry into the United States. His sentence was
enhanced because of his prior aggravated felony conviction under the
8
federal sentencing guidelines. Toledo-Flores also argued that his
conviction, although a felony under Texas state law, did not qualify as
an aggravated felony under the CSA. Because the cases posed the
same legal question, they were consolidated for judgment. The
Supreme Court was asked to resolve whether a state felony
conviction for a drug-related offense qualifies as an aggravated felony
when the conviction under federal law would constitute only a
misdemeanor.
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, the Circuits were
inconsistent in their treatment of state court felony convictions. The
Fifth and Eighth Circuits consistently held that a state felony
conviction, regardless of the treatment under federal law, was an

5.
6.
7.
8.

8 U.S.C. § 1101(43) (penultimate sentence).
Lopez v. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. 625 (2006).
I.N.A. § 240(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).
U.S.S.G. § 2l1.2(b)(10(C).
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“aggravated felony.”9 The Eighth Circuit stated that “Congress made a
deliberate policy decision to include as an ‘aggravated felony’ a drug
crime that is a felony under state law but only a misdemeanor under
the CSA.”10 On the other hand, the Ninth circuit held “a state drug
offense is an aggravated felony for immigration purposes only if it
would be punishable as a felony under federal drug laws or the crime
contains a trafficking element.”11 The Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits
12
agreed with this interpretation.
II. DEFINING “AGGRAVATED FELONY” UNDER IMMIGRATION LAW
In an 8-1 decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
Fifth Circuit’s ruling and agreed with the Second, Third, Sixth, and
Ninth Circuits, holding that a state felony conviction, which would
have been punishable as misdemeanor under federal law, is not an
aggravated felony for purposes of the INA.13 Although Lopez and
Toledo-Flores’s cases were consolidated, the Supreme Court found
that Toledo-Flores’s case was moot. Certiorari was improperly
granted because the petitioner had already served his aggravated
14
felony sentence. Although Toledo-Flores’s appeal concerned the
enhancement of his sentence under Federal Sentencing Guidelines as
a result of his prior state conviction being deemed an aggravated
felony, his sentence was inactive by the time the Supreme Court heard
his case. Conversely, the Court did decide the Lopez controversy even
though he had already been deported. The Court reasoned that Lopez
could still benefit from a ruling because he could file an application
for cancellation of removal.15
In Lopez’s case, the immigration judge initially held that Lopez’s
state offense was not an aggravated felony because the conduct was
16
not punishable under the CSA. However, the same judge reversed
that decision when the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)

9. Lopez v. Gonzalez, 417 F.3d 934 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Hernandez-Avalos,
251 F.3d 505, 510 (5th Cir. 2001).
10. United States v. Briones-Mata, 116 F.3d 308, 310 (8th Cir. 1997).
11. Cazarez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 905, 912 (9th Cir. 2004).
12. Aguirre v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 79 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 1996); GonzalesGomez v. Achim, 441 F.3d 532 (7th Cir. 2006); Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2002);
United States v. Palacios-Suarez, 418 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2005).
13. Lopez v. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. 625 (2006).
14. Toledo-Flores v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 638 (2006).
15. Lopez, 127 S. Ct. at 629.
16. Id. at 628.
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conformed to the Eighth Circuit’s precedent, which considered state
17
felony drug convictions to be aggravated felonies. As a result, Lopez
was unable to apply for a cancellation of his removal, and the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the BIA’s decision.18 The Supreme
Court subsequently granted certiorari. The Government argued for a
unique interpretation of the statutory language of the INA, which
defined a drug trafficking crime as “any felony punishable under the
19
Controlled Substances Act.” According to the Government’s
reading, any offense that was both a felony under state law and
contained conduct that was punishable under the CSA would
constitute an aggravated felony.20 The Supreme Court disagreed, and
ultimately held that Lopez’s conviction of possession of a controlled
substance did not contain the necessary trafficking element to qualify
as an “aggravated felony.”
Writing for the majority, Justice Souter relied upon the plain
meaning of the word “trafficking.” Lopez was charged with aiding and
abetting another individual’s cocaine possession, which is a felony
under South Dakota state law. However, this conduct does not fall
within the realm of “drug trafficking” because “ordinarily, ‘trafficking’
21
means some sort of commercial dealing.” Here, that dealing was not
present. Lopez’s conduct that resulted in the South Dakota conviction
did not contain any trafficking elements. In a footnote, the Court
explained that some forms of illicit trafficking do contain commercial
elements, such as recidivist possession, but the majority was unwilling
to include all possession offenses within the class of drug-trafficking
offenses due to a few exceptions.22
In addition, the Court used the traditional tools of statutory
interpretation to refute the Government’s definition of aggravated
felony. It highlighted that Congress was able to define when
aggravated felonies were expressly based on convictions under state
law in other parts of 18 U.S.C. § 924. “[T]he implication confirms that
the reference solely to a ‘felony punishable under the [CSA]’ in §
23
924(c)(2) is to a crime punishable as a felony under the federal Act.”

17.
18.
19.
20.
2397).
21.
22.
23.

See Matter of Yanez-Garcia, 23 I&N Dec. 390 (2002).
Gonzalez, 417 F.3d at 934.
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2).
Brief of Respondents at 18, Lopez v. Gonzalez, 417 F.3d 934 (8th Cir. 2005) (No. 04Lopez, 127 S. Ct. at 630.
Id.
Id. at 631 (emphasis added).
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The deliberate choice of language within the same Act sheds light on
the intention of Congress to include only offenses that would be
punishable as felonies under the CSA, as opposed to state felonies
that are punishable under the CSA only as misdemeanors. The
Court’s rationale is taken directly from the petitioner’s brief.
Petitioner asserted that Congress in 18 U.S.C. § 924 expressly used the
language “state law convictions” in subsections (g)(3) and (k)(2).24
When placed in juxtaposition with subsection § 924(c), it becomes
clear that “Congress understood drug offenses ‘punishable under the
Controlled Substances Act’ not to include state offenses.”25 Here, the
Court agreed with this reasoning and determined Congress’ intent
from the deliberate use of language in parallel subsections within §
924.
The Government also wanted the court to view § 924’s definition
of “sentence” as two distinct parts: (1) “felony” and (2) “punishable
under the CSA.” Once separated, the state conviction need only be a
felony and contain conduct punishable under the CSA; the CSA need
not punish such behavior as a felony as well. However, the Court
disagreed with this reading. “The Government stresses that the text
does not read ‘punishable as a felony.’”26 Instead, the Court reasoned,
“[w]e do not use a phrase like ‘felony punishable under the [CSA]’
when we mean to signal or allow a break between the noun ‘felony’
and the contiguous modifier ‘punishable under the CSA.’ . . .”27 The
Court found no apparent reason to separate a noun from the modifier
next to it.28 As a result, the Court refused to hold that a misdemeanor
punishable under the Act should be considered an aggravated
29
felony. In order to be deemed an aggravated felony, the offense must
be a felony that is punishable as a felony under the CSA.30
Nevertheless, the Court did not require that every state conviction
have an identical federal counterpart to suffice as an aggravated
felony. Instead, “a state offense whose elements include the elements
31
of a felony punishable under the CSA is an aggravated felony.”

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Brief of Petitioner at 23, Lopez v. Gonzalez, 417 F.3d 934 (8th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-2397).
Id.
Lopez, 127 S. Ct. at 631.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 633.
Id. at 631.
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The Government’s argument relied on the penultimate sentence
of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), where the definition of aggravated felonies
32
included crimes “whether in violation of state and federal law” to
support its interpretation of the INA. However, the Court determined
that the Government’s contention was without merit and found no
evidence that this last sentence was intended to change the definition
of “aggravated felony” that Congress incorporated from Title 18 §
924(c)(2).33 The Government admitted “it has never begun a
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) where the underlying
‘drug trafficking crime’ was a state felony but a federal
misdemeanor.”34 The penultimate sentence opens the door for state
convictions to be treated as aggravated felonies under the INA, but
the state felony convictions cannot be based on criminal conduct that
would only suffice to sustain a misdemeanor conviction under federal
law.35
Lastly, the Court believed that the Government’s interpretation of
the INA would create an unpredictable situation because the
determination of aggravated felonies would be based upon different
state criminal classifications. Congress specifically incorporated its
own statutory scheme from Title 18 when it defined a drug trafficking
crime under § 924(c)(2). The majority asserted that Congress would
not have gone through this trouble if it “meant courts to ignore [that
36
scheme] whenever a State chose to punish a given act more heavily.”
Here, the Court identified the potential consequences of this
approach. If a state punishes possession of one gram of contraband as
a felony, then a state convict is subject to mandatory deportation
because, like Lopez, he will be unable to petition for cancellation of
removal.37 However, the CSA expressly excludes from the list of
deportable controlled substance violations “single offense[s] involving
38
possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less.” Even though the
federal government had deliberately excluded this type of possession
offense as grounds for automatic deportation, state statutory schemes
would be capable of overriding congressional intent. The Supreme
Court did not want the determination of whether an offense is an

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).
Lopez, 127 S. Ct. at 632.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 633.
Id.
21 U.S.C. § 844(a).
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“aggravated felony” to turn on the specific statutory scheme of each
state. As a result, here, the Court followed Congress’ intent to define
aggravated felonies in accordance with federal law.
As the lone dissenter, Justice Thomas was not persuaded by the
majority’s reasoning. He did not agree that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2)
requires the Board of Immigration to define felonies according to
federal law. Like the Government, Thomas relied on the plain
meaning of the word felony, which is any crime that is punishable by
more than one year in prison.39 Also, Justice Thomas disagreed with
the majority’s claim that all trafficking offenses must contain a
40
commercial element. In fact, by the majority’s own admission, some
possession crimes fall within the definition of “illicit trafficking.”
These possession offenses are not merely a small class of exceptions,
but “must include every type of possession offense under the CSA, so
long as the offender has had a previous possession offense.” The CSA
includes repeat possession offenders within the class of “illicit
trafficking.”41 He believed that the majority overlooked these
important exceptions, and he agreed with the Government that any
state felony conviction that is also punishable under the CSA is an
aggravated felony.
Furthermore, Justice Thomas was not convinced that the various
state statutory schemes create inconsistent results. He rejected the
hypothetical offered by the majority as outrageous because no state
would ever punish the possession of one gram of a controlled
substance as a felony. In fact, it would be rare for the state and federal
statutory scheme to depart dramatically: “[t]he mere possibility that a
case could fall into this small gap and lead to removal provides no
ground for the court to depart from the plain meaning of §
42
924(c)(2).” Justice Thomas explained that the majority’s decision will
more significantly affect state removal proceedings because federal
law tends to treat possession of large quantities of a controlled
43
substance more harshly than state law. Regardless, Justice Thomas’s
reasoning did not sway the other eight justices.
III. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Lopez, 127 S. Ct. at 634 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 635–36.
21 U.S.C. § 844(a).
Lopez, 127 S. Ct. at 637 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id.
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The Supreme Court’s decision will affect many immigrants with
drug related convictions. The Los Angeles Times reported, “[f]rom
mid-1997 to May 2006, federal officials used the aggravated felony
provisions to deport an estimated 156,713 people through court
proceedings, according to the Transactional Records Access
Clearinghouse.”44 Because so many immigrants are deported as a
result of criminal convictions, the Court’s ruling will provide some
immigrants with the chance to file a cancellation of removal
application. However, all immigrants will not be affected by the
change in deportation procedures. “[The Lopez v. Gonzales] decision
does not affect illegal immigrants, who can be deported simply by
virtue of being in the United States. It also doesn’t affect naturalized
citizens, who are treated like all other citizens and cannot be deported
for criminal convictions.”45 With respect to legal immigrants, the
definition of “aggravated felony” has been revised to create
consistency amongst the circuits. Automatic deportation will not be
required if a legal immigrant is convicted of a possession offense in a
state whose statutory scheme punishes the offense as a felony, as long
as the offense in not also a felony under federal law.
This case represents the second time in two years that the highest
court has overruled the executive branch’s interpretation of an
immigration law. In 2004, the Court held that driving under the
influence was not a crime of violence that required automatic
deportation.46 Additionally, on December 5, 2006, the Supreme Court
heard oral arguments in Duenas-Alvarez v. Gonzales, a case involving
a Peruvian citizen who was found guilty under California law of
aiding and abetting the theft of an automobile.47 The Ninth Circuit
overturned the automatic deportation order in Duenas-Alvarez,
holding that the California offense does not categorically qualify as a
“theft offense” because it punishes a broader class of theft than
defined under federal law, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)(G).48 In Lopez, the
Supreme Court held that federal law should be used to define what
constitutes an aggravated felony. In deciding Duenas-Alvarez, the

44. David G. Savage, Court Bars Automatic Deportation in Drug Cases, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
6, 2006, at A1.
45. Bob Egelko, Legal immigrants can fight drug-related deportations; High court rules state
crimes not grounds for automatic expulsion, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 6, 2006, at A16.
46. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004).
47. Duenas-Alvarez v. Gonzales, 176 F. App’x. 820 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct.
35 (Sept. 26, 2006).
48. Id.
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Court should be consistent, and hold that an over-inclusive state
criminal statute cannot be used to require automatic deportation
unless the conduct would have also been punishable “as a felony”
under federal law.

